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Summit Break-down

16 May 1960

At Preliminary meeting of Heads of Government in Paris, Khrushchev condemned the United States in relation to the U-2 spy flights and gave his four-point ultimatum for continuing with the Summit Conference.

Eisenhower issued statement following preliminary meeting with regard to his reply to Khrushchev and saying "Mr. Khrushchev was left in no doubt by me that his ultimatum would never be acceptable to the United States.

17 May 1960

President de Gaulle extended invitations for a meeting to be held the afternoon of May 17 which would be a formal meeting of the Summit Conference attendees to consider the problems the Conference had been organized to work at solving. The U.S., France and U.K. were present but the USSR boycotted the meeting.

A joint communique was issued 17 May:

"The President of the United States, the President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom take note of the fact that because of

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the attitude adopted by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union it has not been possible to begin, at the Summit Conference, the examination of the problems which it had been agreed would be discussed between the four Chiefs of State or Government.

They regret that these ~~xx~~ discussions, so important for world peace, could not take place. For their part, they remain ;unshaken in their conviction that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the use or threat of force but by peaceful means through negotiations. They themselves remain ready to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future."

26 May 1960 Ambassador Lodge in his statement before the United Nations Security Council rebutting the Soviet Draft Resolution charging the U.S. with aggression, displayed the wooden replica of the Great Seal of the U.S. presented by Soviets to the American Ambassador in Moscow and hung in his office, which had the concealed listening device hidden inside it.

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Speech by Sen. John F. Kennedy in the Senate June 14, 1960

"....On May 17, 1960 the long-awaited, highly publicized summit conference collapsed. That collapse was the direct result of Soviet determination to destroy the talks. The insults and distortions of Mr. Khrushchev and the violence of his attacks shocked all Americans...regardless of Party all of us deeply resented Russian abuse of this Nation...Nevertheless, it is imperative that we, as a nation, rise above our resentment and frustration to a critical reexamination of the events at Paris and their meaning for America.

I do not now intend to rehash the sorry story of the U-2 incident. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has raised, in a constructive manner, the questions which must be raised, if we are to profit from the unfortunate experience. Nor do I wish to exaggerate the long-range importance of the U-2 incident or the Khrushchev attacks in Paris.

For the harsh facts of the matter are that the efforts to eliminate world tensions and end the cold war through a summit meeting--necessary as such an effort was to demonstrate America's willingness to seek peaceful solutions--was doomed to failure long before the U-2 incident.

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"This effort was doomed to failure because we have failed for the past 8 years to build the positions of long-term strength essential to successful negotiation. It was doomed because we were unprepared with new policy or new programs for the settlement of outstanding substantive issues. It was doomed because the Soviet Union knew it had more to gain from the increasing deterioration of America's world position than from any concessions that might be made in Paris. Only Mr. Khrushchev's intransigence and violent temper saved the United States from an embarrassing exposure of their inability to make the summit meaningful."

"This is the real issue of American foreign policy today, not the ill-considered timing of the U-2 or the inconsistent statements of our Government. The real issue--and the real lesson of Paris--is the lack of long-range ~~plan~~ preparation, the lack of policy planning, the lack of a coherent and purposeful national strategy backed by strength.

This is an issue worthy of a great debate, a debate by the American people through the media of their political parties--and that debate must not be stifled or degraded by empty appeals to national unity..."